Abstract-A substantial effort has been devoted to various incentive Stackelberg solution concepts. Most of these concepts work well in the sense that the leader can get his desired solution in the end. Yet, most incentive strategies developed thus far include either the follower's control, which may not be realistic in practice, or delays in the state, which makes stabilization more difficult to achieve. In this paper, we obtain the team-optimal state feedback Stackelberg strategy (with no delays) of an important class of discrete-time two-person nonzero-sum dynamic games characterized by linear state dynamics and quadratic cost functionals.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N 1930, H. von Stackelberg [1] originally suggested the leader-follower solution concept, also known as the Stackelberg solution concept, for static economic competition. Then, in the 1970s, Chen and Cruz [2] , and Simaan and Cruz [3] , [4] presented dynamic versions of this solution concept in a control framework. The dynamic Stackelberg solution is appropriate in nonzero-sum dynamic games when a hierarchy in decision-making exists. By hierarchy, we mean the decision makers hold nonsymmetrical roles in the decision-making process. One of the players (the leader) has the ability to announce his strategy in advance and announce it to the other player (the follower). By taking into account the projected rational response of the follower, the leader seeks that policy which leads to a most favorable outcome for him. [4] , [14] - [19] . Under this concept, the two cost-to-go functionals retain their optimal feedback Stackelberg properties after any number of stages. Hence, dynamic programming holds. This property seems attractive, but the feedback Stackelberg strategy is not a Stackelberg strategy except for a one-stage game. Fortunately, if the equilibrium solution is also a team-optimal solution, then the resulting strategy is a Stackelberg equilibrium solution.
A. Solution Concept
B. Incentive Format
The idea of declaring a reward (punishment) for a decision maker according to his particular choice of action in order to induce certain "desired" behavior on the part of the other decision maker is known as incentive (threat) [5] - [10] , [13] , [16] , [20] . At least three kinds of incentive policies were investigated in the literature.
The first approach results in a punishment (value of follower's objective function is worse) when the follower's control deviates from the desired value [5] , [6] , and it is a linear form , where is the control of the leader; is the control of the follower; and superscript represents the desired value for the leader. In most cases, these desired values of the controls are chosen to be the same as the team-optimal values. This approach is effective, and it has already been proved that under certain kind of constraints on the objective functions and the system matrices, an incentive matrix could always be found so that the desired values are obtained. However, one limitation of this form is that it requires the leader's exact knowledge of the follower's control, which is acceptable in team problems, but problematic in dynamic games in general.
The second approach was proposed by Basar and Selbuz [7] . It uses the one-step-delay memory representation , implying that at each stage , the leader's control depends not only on the state information at the present stage , but also on the previous stage . This approach could be extended to -step delay memory representation easily. However, guaranteeing stability was not considered in [7] .
The third approach, using a no-memory state feedback representation and the only attempt so far that includes stability analysis, is the one by Salman and Cruz [8] . A sufficient condition 1083-4427/02$17.00 © 2002 IEEE (with system stability guaranteed) for the leader to enforce his team optimum was proposed. However, the result only applies to the continuous case (without proof). With the importance of digital control, discrete-time problems are important as well.
In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg games. We design an incentive policy for the leader, while the follower's rational reaction guarantees system stability, using a no-memory state feedback representation. For simplicity, pure state feedback strategies in LQ games are investigated.
We investigate the finite-time case in Section II. Then, we extend the problem to the infinite-time case in Section III with stabilization consideration. A proposition for two-person discrete-time LQ incentive state feedback Stackelberg games is given and proven in Section III. We develop a numerical example in Section IV to illustrate the effectiveness of the incentive policy. Finally, we draw conclusions and enumerate some possible future expansions in Section V.
II. FINITE-TIME CASE
A. Problem Formulation
Consider a linear discrete-time system described as (1) where is the state vector; and for are the control or decision vectors chosen by Players 1 and 2, respectively. We assume that each player has a quadratic cost function (2) where subscripts represent different players, respectively; is symmetric and positive semi-definite matrix, and and are symmetric positive definite matrices for any time step .
The dimensions of each matrix or vector are indicated as where We assume that each player only has access to perfect state information. At time step , the information available to the players is and . Each player chooses his strategy from the space of admissible strategies , such that it minimizes its objective through the realization for . Our goal is to introduce an incentive strategy that will achieve the leader's team optimum under certain constraints. We call the corresponding leader team-optimal controls of the leader and follower and , respectively, and the state trajectory . Without loss of generality, we assume that Player 1 is the leader.
B. Solution
Since the ultimate goal of the leader is to induce the follower to act in a way that the leader's team optimum is achieved, the team-optimal solution is calculated first as a basis for any further derivations. After that, the rational reaction of the follower is calculated under the incentive strategy of the leader. The leader chooses incentive matrix such that the optimal reaction of the follower is .
1) Team-Optimal Solution:
In the team optimization part, both of the players optimize the leader's objective .
Using standard optimal control theory, the team-optimal control is (3) where (4) Similarly, the team-optimal control is (5) where (6) with matrix satisfying the following recursive equation and boundary condition:
The associated team-optimal state trajectory is (9) 2) Incentive Feedback Strategy: After obtaining the team optimum of the leader, let us now investigate how the follower can be induced to cooperate so that the optimum reaction control for minimizing is exactly , resulting in and . Assume that the leader uses the following incentive strategy:
The problem is to find a sequence of matrices , so that the team-optimal solution of the leader is achieved.
The follower optimizes his own objective function where is given by (10) . First, form the Hamiltonian (11) Using the minimum principle (12) with boundary condition (13) and (14) (15) Assume that takes the form (16) where and are matrices of proper dimensions, then (17) Suppose that can be chosen such that the following condition holds: (18) (This gives rise to one of the conditions of Proposition 1 in Section III.) Then, can be related to by (19) From the state equation (20) we obtain the expression for in terms of (21) Substituting (21) and (16) into (12) is chosen as , where is any matrix such that the system is asymptotically stable, the resulting control of the follower is still optimal. Also, can be added to the right-hand side of (26) (27) where is defined as
Hence, has no effect on the follower's optimal control.
By applying the boundary condition (13) on (16), we obtain the boundary conditions on III. INFINITE-TIME CASE
A. Problem Formulation
For the infinite-time case, the system matrices in the state equation and the weighing matrices in the objective functions are assumed to be time-invariant, i.e., the system described by (1) and (2) becomes (32) with the objective functions (33) with similar constraints on the weighting matrices , , and as described in Section II. As time goes to infinity, assume all the matrices converge: 
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
A. Simplified Homeland Security Model
A numerical example is given in this section to illustrate the effectiveness of the strategy derived earlier. We consider a simplified linear discrete-time model describing the interplay between maintaining a certain level of homeland security and a healthy level of tourism. International tourism is the world's largest item of trade and represents a major industry in over 100 nations [11] . Recent attacks by terrorists have had a negative impact on travel patterns and the economies of countries. With increased focus on security, there is a dampening effect on tourism. However, security needs to be maintained. The formulation we use here is a rather simplified model of the interplay between two groups of decision makers: the tourism industry and the government. We assume that tourism in a country is affected by the policy of the tourism industry as a whole and the policy of the government to maintain some level of security. The problem is modeled as an LQ feedback Stackelberg game problem. Both players assume a linear relationship between the number of tourists and a surrogate number to represent a level of security to mitigate threat. In the steady state, , where is a positive number and is determined by the steady state values of , , and . Player 1 wants to be small, while Player 2 wants to be large. Thus, Player 1 will use a cost function assuming a level of security that has a small value while Player 2 will use a cost function assuming a level of security that has a large value with , and , being parameters beyond the control of either player.
In formulating their own objectives, both players have a budget expectation on the expenses spent on the efforts they undertake. The expenses with regard to tourism are twofold for each player. For Player 1, it undertakes investment in order to increase the number of tourists. On the other hand, it spends money on enforcement of security in order to reduce threat and thus reduce . For Player 2, in an effort to increase , it invests to increase the security level directly, and which has an effect of directly decreasing . (If there is a public perception of increasing , there is a perception of a greater threat, which dampens tourism.)
The numbers and are the state variables; and and are the control variables for Player , respectively.
1) State Equations:
The number increases with tourism investments, but decreases with investments for increasing the security level . On the other hand, increases with a flourishing tourism and direct investments in security, but decreases with security enforcement activities. With consideration of natural decay rates of both and , the state equations for the linear model are 44) where the coefficients define different linear relationships between and . It is clear that the larger the value of is, the larger is, as increases. stands for the control variables of Player 1; stands for the control variables of Player 2. and are the budget expectation on investment and enforcement activities of Players 1 and 2, respectively. Since the expectations of the two players are different, there are conflicts. In this example, we first assume that Player 1 is the leader and Player 2 is the follower. Then, we assume that Player 2 is the leader and Player 1 is the follower. All other specifications are the same.
B. Solution
Before using the algorithm procedure discussed in Section III, we need to change the model into a standard regulator game described by (1) and (2) .
First, we will calculate the steady-state values of and . In order to have a well-posed problem, the coefficients are set to guarantee that the expected relationship between and could be reached in the steady state. As time goes to infinity Note that the constant term in (55) disappears because the coefficients and are chosen in the following way. As time goes to infinity, the states and controls are to be regulated to zero value. This requires that the coefficients and satisfy
This will make the constant term in (55) vanish. Similarly, we can obtain
Equations (55) and (58) 
These are exactly the standard forms discussed in the previous sections. Now we are ready to use the algorithm procedure given in Section III to solve the problem. The numerical values used are
The weighting coefficients in the objective functions are chosen to be Plots of the optimal state trajectory as well as the optimal controls are given in Figs. 1-4 , where Player 1 is the leader. No units are specified, and the numerical values should be viewed in relative terms.
Next, we consider the case when Player 2 is the leader. All parameter values are the same as before. Figs. 5-8 show corresponding plots for the case when Player 2 is the leader. Note that Player 2 as leader allows a much higher level of security at the start than in the case when Player 2 is the follower.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER REMARKS
A. Conclusions
In this paper, we developed an incentive strategy for discrete-time LQ state feedback Stackelberg games, with stability guaranteed by the follower. Sufficient conditions were given to find the incentive matrix . A feasible calculation procedure and a numerical example were discussed to illustrate the effectiveness of our design. 
B. Further Remarks 1)
One important aspect of the incentive feedback Stackelberg solution presented in this paper is that it is also a feedback Nash equilibrium solution for the dynamic game under consideration, since it satisfies the following two inequalities simultaneously:
2) Although sufficient conditions were given to find the matrix , we could not guarantee that this could always be found. No definite calculation procedure was proposed due to the complication induced by the matrix equations. It would be more convenient to express the conditions in Section III directly in terms of the parameters of the problem, but unfortunately, no such general formulation is yet available. Given the value of , in order for to be solvable in the general case, we need the dimension constraints:
, which means that Player 1 must have as many control variables as there are state variables.
3) What we have done was based on no-memory state feedback information. What if utilization of delayed state information were allowed? An approach might be to reformulate the feedback problems in terms of a general memory structure. For example, the feedback control may be a function of the states at times , , and . However, this will dramatically increase the dynamic controller dimension, and thus may be impractical. Sufficient conditions for continuous-time Stackelberg and Nash strategies with memory are discussed in [12] . 
